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Abstract 
This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model where child labour 
is present. We argue that the degree of parental altruism is determined by the level of 
schooling of the parent. A more educated parent has more willingness to invest in human 
capital formation of child. These differences in preferences of parent towards offspring’s 
schooling bear significant effects on the long run dynamics of schooling.  In this context, we 
study the efficacy of child labour ban vis-a-vis education subsidy in enhancing schooling and 
reducing child labour. In an extension of the basic model, we also study the dynamics of 
schooling in the presence of learning by doing effect in unskilled work.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, two key papers that emphasize on endogenous parental altruism are Mulligan 
(1997) and Das (2007). According to Mulligan (1997), parental altruism depends on the time 
spent with children. The time spent with children is optimally decided by the parents on the basis 
of utility maximization exercise. Since high wage families have higher opportunity cost of time, 
high income dynasties will spend less time with children and therefore will be less altruistic. On 
the contrary, Das (2007) assumes that the degree of parental altruism positively varies with the 
earning ability of the parent. To capture the positive relationship between the degree of parental 
altruism and parents’ economic status the weight on children’s human capital formation in the 
utility function of the parent is assumed to be an increasing function of the parent’s own 
consumption. A poor parent is likely to attach less weight to children’s education than a rich 
parent. Not only does a poor parent have less ability to invest in children’s human capital 
formation, but also has less willingness. This factor contributes towards perpetuation of lower 
earning abilities generation after generation. 
 
In the present paper, the degree of parental altruism is endogenously determined too and is 
assumed to vary with the level of schooling of the parent. Parents derive direct utility from 
human capital formation of the child. Here the weight assigned to human capital formation of the 
child is a direct function of the level of parental schooling. As we move from lower educated 
parents to higher educated parents, perceived utility derived from the schooling of the child 
increases. This in turn affects the long run dynamics of schooling. 
 
Parental altruism factor plays a major role in ascertaining the child labour status of children in 
any household. In fact parental decision regarding schooling of the child is one of the key factors 
affecting human capital formation of child which in turn determines the intergenerational 
persistence of child labour. In our paper we assume that parents allocate the time of her child 
between schooling and work. Thus, parental altruism has a direct bearing on child labour. 
 
Along with the endogenous altruism, in an extension of the basic model, we assume learning by 
doing effect to be present in unskilled work.  In the developing countries, apprenticeship is very 
common among child labour. Often learning by doing occurs through apprenticeship, and in real 
life, apprenticeship is found mostly in the informal or unskilled sector. Apprenticeship provides 
vocational education in many fields, e.g. carpentry, farming, masonry, fishing, poultry where 
knowledge is transmitted through prolonged practice rather than acquiring formal knowledge 
base. According to World Employment Report 1998-99-“In Kenya, there are more apprentices 
enrolled in the informal sector than trainees in the formal sector”, while “in Egypt, over 80% of 
craftsmen in the construction sector acquire their skills through traditional apprenticeship.” 
According to the report, apprenticeship is common among child labour. According to ILO’s 
report on Employment Sector (2008), apprenticeship has been providing the traditional solution 
for developing and financing vocational skills of young people in deprived societies. Estimations 
suggest that 80% of the skills imparted in the informal economy in West Africa are transferred 
through apprenticeship. In Benin, in 2005, approximately 2000,000 young apprentices were 
trained, which represents ten times as many apprentices than students in vocational and technical 
education. But there are very few child labour papers that capture this learning by doing effect. 
In the extended model, we assume experience as child labour pays additional return to unskilled 
labourers during their adulthood.  
 
 A number of rules and conventions have been laid down all over the world to fight child labour. 
Two most effective policies that may be undertaken to reduce child labour are child labour ban 
and education subsidy. The pioneer work on child labour by Basu and Van (1998) shows that in 
case of multiple equilibria in the labour market, a total ban on child labour can take the economy 
from bad equilibrium to good equilibrium. All working class households will be better off. But if 
there is only one equilibrium, a total ban may or may not make worker households better off. A 
partial ban may not always reduce child labour but may reduce only child wage. However utility 
of the worker household may or may not increase. According to Baland and Robinson (2000) 
small ban on child labour can be Pareto improving. A ban on child labour reduces the supply of 
child labour while increasing the supply of adult labour in the future. As a result, current wages 
of both adults and children are likely to rise and future wages are likely to fall. Thus while 
children’s utility is likely to rise in most cases, parental welfare will increase only when the 
effect on current wages dominates. The paper by Dessy and Pallage (2001) states that 
compulsory bans on child labour help sending signals to investors that investment in human 
capital will be made in the near future and thus skilled labour is likely to be available. Ban or 
compulsory education will be counterproductive if the cost of investment is very high. Instead a 
policy that subsidizes technology and imposes compulsory education can help to move the 
economy from bad equilibrium to a good one. Dinopoulos and Zhao (2007), in their paper on 
globalisation, show that a ban on child labours benefits adult unskilled workers but hurts adult 
skilled workers. According to Emerson and Knabb (2006), P.Ranjan (1999, 2001) banning child 
labour can reduce dynastic welfare, increase poverty and further accentuate income inequality 
within society.  
 
This paper builds a theoretical model to examine the relative effectiveness of two types of 
domestic policies to combat child labour-a child labour ban and an education subsidy. Both 
domestic as well as international policies may be undertaken to reduce the incidence of child 
labour. However, in this paper we restrict our analysis only to domestic policies. A number of 
theoretical papers deal with the effectiveness of domestic policies to reduce child labour. Papers 
that deal with ban on harmful forms of child labour include Rogers and Swinnerton (2002) and 
Dessy and Pallage (2005).  
 
There is a small set of literature that deals with the effects of education subsidy on child labour. 
Emerson and Knabb (2006) show that compulsory education policy may actually reduce welfare. 
According to Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2003), a rise in the education subsidy may force 
the rural workers to migrate to the urban areas with their children. This increases the supply of 
child labour in the urban sector which further accentuates the problem of urban unemployment of 
adult labour. Moreover it may raise the level of urban unemployment of adults even when adult 
labour and child labour are not substitutes to each other. The average income of the urban poor 
families may also decrease as a consequence. Chaudhuri (2004) states that the effects of increase 
in education subsidy on child labour depends on relative strength of two effects-namely labour 
re-allocation effect and the contradictory effect which exerts a downward pressure on the 
incidence of child labour. Mukherjee and Sinha (2006) and Estevez (2011) argue in favour of 
education subsidy in improving school attendance. According to Estevez (2011), an education 
subsidy will reduce the incidence of child labour, increase the household income and will also 
indirectly increase the unskilled wage. 
 
Some empirical studies have also been conducted to analyze the impact of domestic policies on 
child labour1.  But, none of the papers mentioned so far have theoretically examined the effects 
of ban and education subsidy on steady state schooling and steady state human capital of child 
labour. This paper attempts to understand the effects of child labour ban and education subsidy 
on steady state schooling and steady state human capital of child labour. Moreover this paper 
studies the relative effectiveness of child labour ban and education subsidy in improving 
schooling of the child. 
 
The theoretical analysis of this paper helps us to get some interesting results. We find that the 
relationship between parental schooling and child schooling is monotonically increasing in 
general but, in the presence of learning by doing effect in unskilled work this relationship is not 
monotonically increasing. There is no opportunity of full schooling of child of unskilled parent 
except when unskilled adult wage exceeds expenditure. We also find that banning child labour 
will increase steady state schooling if the unskilled adult wage exceeds the sum of the schooling 
cost and subsistence consumption expenditure of the household.  If the adult unskilled wage is 
less than the subsistence consumption expenditure or even if adult unskilled wage exceeds 
subsistence expenditure but is sufficiently small, the effect of giving education subsidy is higher 
than child labour ban in enhancing schooling. In the presence of learning by doing effect cycles 
emerge in the time path of schooling in unskilled sector.  
 
                                                          
1
 Fabre and Pallage (2011), Schultz (2004), Ravallion and Wodon (2000), Krueger and Donohue (2005). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 describes the 
short run equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the long run dynamics. In section 5 we discuss the 
comparative static results. In section 6 we discuss the policy implications. Section 7 compares 
the effects of ban and subsidy on child labour. Section 8 discusses the case where learning by 
doing effect is present in unskilled wage. Concluding remarks are made in section 9. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider an economy that consists of identical households in overlapping generations 
framework2.Each household consists of one adult and one child. We consider two parents as one 
adult and two children as one child. The economy consists of two sectors- a skilled sector and an 
unskilled sector. In first period agents are children. They may either work in unskilled sector or 
go to school. In second period, the agent on reaching adulthood may either work in unskilled 
sector or in the skilled sector. If one individual is employed in skilled sector she gets wage 
proportional to human capital whereas unskilled sector gives a fixed return. The adult or the 
parent decides the time allocation of her child between work and schooling. Utility function of 
the adult depends on family consumption and human capital formation of the child. Parental 
altruism is endogenously determined. It is an increasing function of the level of parental 
schooling. More educated parents have more preference towards child’s human capital. 
 
Following Glomm (1997), we assume parental choice of human capital investment. The adult 
decides how much time her child would devote to work in the unskilled sector and how much 
time for schooling by maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint. Wages earned by the 
                                                          
2
Overlapping generations framework has been adopted by Becker and Tomes (1979), Acemoglu and Pischke (2000), Glomm 
(1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and many more. 
 
adult and by the child constitute the total income of the household. If the child joins the skilled 
sector, on becoming adult, she gets a wage in the skilled sector which is a fixed proportion of the 
human capital possessed by her (δht)3. In unskilled sector, the adult gets a fixed return ‘A’. 
A child, by working in the unskilled sector also gets a fixed return which is less than the return 
obtained by the adults from unskilled sector. 
 
Like Moav (2005), this paper assumes that human capital evolution is independent of physical 
capital. Human capital accumulation function of a child is assumed to take the following form4: 
ht+1 = bst           (1) 
where ‘st’ is the time devoted to studies by the child, b>0 is a positive constant representing 
education technology. 
In case of unskilled parent household income is given by: 
Yt =A+Aφ (1-st ) ,                                                                                   (2) 
Where Yt is total income of the household, A is wage earned by the adult in unskilled sector, φ is 
the fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives. Here 0<φ<1 is a positive constant. 
The household spends its income on purchasing consumption good and schooling of the child. 
So, the budget constraint of the household is given by: 
 A+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst,                                                                                            (3) 
                                                          
3
Hare and Ulph (1979) assume that wage rate depends on ability and amount of education received by an individual. 
 
4
 Inclusion of parental human capital in human capital accumulation of child yields nonlinear equations and makes the model 
very complicated. So, for the sake of simplicity the human capital accumulation of child is assumed to take this form.  
where pc is the price of the consumption good, pcct represents the total consumption expenditure 
and ρst denotes the expenditure on schooling of the child. When adults work in the skilled sector, 
household income is given by: 
Yt = wt + Aφ (1-st ) ,                                                                                                         
Where wt is the wage earned by the adult in the skilled sector. We assume wage earned in skilled 
sector (wt) is proportional to the human capital acquired by that individual i.e. wt= δht. 
Utility function of an adult of the representative household is defined as follows: 
Ut= ln (ct-c) + st-1 ln (bst) if ct≥c 
      = -∞ otherwise                   (4) 
Where ct represents consumption,c represents subsistence consumption. The utility function is 
defined on the range ct≥c. Utility depends on consumption of the adult and human capital 
formation of the child. Higher is the education level of the parent (st-1), more is the importance 
that she gives to human capital accumulation of the child. 
 
Let us first apply the model in the short run equilibrium context and understand the relationship 
between parental human capital and schooling of the child. 
 
3. Short-run Equilibrium  
3.1 Parents working in the unskilled sector 
Utility maximization problem of an adult of the representative household working in unskilled 
sector is to maximize the utility, given by equation (4) subject to the budget constraint given by 
equation (3) with respect to the decision variables of the household viz, ct and st 
From the first order conditions5of the optimization problem, if there exists an interior solution of 
st, we obtain: 
st =
(	
	)
(
)(	
)
         
(5)
 
st>0 if A(1+φ)-pc>0.  
So A(1+φ) -pc > 0	is a necessary condition for st being positive.  
Note that if st-1=0 then st=0 because dz/dst<0.  
 
st = 1 if st-1≥

	

 = s. This implies that lower is the total expenditure of the household 
(ρ+pc) and higher is the earning of the unskilled adult (A), higher is the possibility of full 
schooling of the child. Therefore, if total earning of the household headed by an unskilled adult 
exceeds the subsistence expenditure of the household, then the child of that household 
experiences positive schooling and if total expenditure of the household is low enough and 
earning of the unskilled adult is sufficiently high, there is higher chance that the child 
experiences full schooling. Full schooling by a child of an unskilled labourer would be possible 
to attain only if s <1. 
s <1 implies A(1 − φ) > pc +2ρ 
Differentiating st with respect to s	we get 


 = 
(	
)
(
)(	
	)
 
Since A(1 + φ) − pc> 0 for positive schooling, therefore, 


>0 when st >0. 
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 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) of Appendix A. 


  = 
![(	
)]
(
)(	
	)$
< 0 
 
Since more educated parents give more importance to human capital accumulation of the child, it 
is quite natural that with increase in schooling of the parent, schooling of child will also increase. 
 
3.2 Parents working in the skilled sector 
When parents work in the skilled sector, the incentive compatibility condition requires that wage 
earned in skilled sector is higher than the wage earned in unskilled sector. This implies 
that	w
	> A which implies that δ(bs)>A i.e. st>

()
= s. This implies that only if st>s, then only 
individuals join the skilled sector. 
When adults work in the skilled sector, the budget constraint of the household is given by: 
δ bst-1+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst where δ bst-1denotes income of the adult working in the skilled 
sector. 
In this case schooling of the child is given by 
st=
()
	
(
)(	
)
 
st>0 if δbs	 + φA − pc>0 or s	>
	
	()
. This implies that higher is the child’s earning as 
fraction of the adult wage (Aφ) and lower is the subsistence expenditure (pc ), higher is the 
possibility of positive schooling of the child. 
st = 1 if δbs	! −(pc+ρ)s	-(Aφ + ρ)≥ 0 
This implies that there exists a positive value of s	say s+	for which st = 1. 
Ifs>s+ then all parents who are employed in the skilled sector send their children for full 
schooling. 
 
Differentiating st with respect to s	we get 


 = 
()
 
	!()

(
)(	
	)
 


> 0 if st >0. 


  = 
![()
]
(
)(	
	)$
 >0. 
In the next section, we study the long run dynamics of schooling and human capital. 
 
4. Long run Dynamics 
4.1 Dynamics of schooling  
Putting st=	s	= s,∗ in the expression of st in equation (5) we obtain the steady state schooling in 
the unskilled sector we get 
s,∗= 



.  
If 0< s<1, then s,∗  >1 and if 0<s,∗<1, then s>1. 
s <1 implies A(1 − φ) > pc +2ρ 
Proposition 1: When unskilled adult wage is low compared to the expenditure, there exists 
interior equilibrium s,∗ , full schooling equilibrium for unskilled parent cannot occur; and if 
unskilled adult wage is sufficiently high, full schooling equilibrium occurs, interior equilibrium 
does not exist. 
Similarly, we obtain the steady state schooling in the skilled sector 
s∗= 


()
 
We know that, in case of s< s+ 
the dynamics of s for both u
the following diagram: 
Figure 1: Dynamics of schooling for both unskilled sector and skilled sector when skilled parent 
may send her child for partial schooling
 
In Figure 1 we demonstrate the 
when skilled parent may send her child for partial schooling
convergent in nature in unskilled sector. The steady state schooling in unskille
by s*u. Unskilled parent always sends her child for partial schooling. 
 
skilled parent may send her child for partial schooling. In this case, 
nskilled and skilled sectors would be similar and that is shown in 
 
dynamics of schooling for both unskilled and skilled sectors 
. Time path of schooling is stable and 
 There are two equilibria in 
 
d sector is denoted 
the skilled sector out of which one is unstable and the other is stable. The unstable equilibrium 
schooling in skilled sector is denoted by	s∗. Beyond	s∗, s keeps on rising till it reaches full 
schooling. Below	s∗, s is first falling, then rising and finally converges to steady state schooling 
in unskilled sector (s*u). At this equilibrium, skilled parent would send her child for partial 
schooling. The stable equilibrium is the full schooling equilibrium. Full schooling is denoted by 
s*=1. 
Proposition 2: When s< s+ and s >1, schooling of the child of an unskilled parent would always 
converge to stable equilibrium E. If schooling of a skilled parent is below s∗, schooling of her 
child will converge to steady state schooling of unskilled sector (s*u). Beyond s∗	, schooling of 
child will keep on increasing till it reaches full schooling. 
 When s>s+ the skilled parent always sends her child for full schooling. In this case, there exists 
unique steady state equilibrium s∗ = 1.The dynamics of s for both unskilled and skilled sectors 
in this case is shown in the following diagram: 
Figure 2: Dynamics of schooling for both
always sends her child for full schooling
In Figure 2, we demonstrate the 
when s>s+ and skilled parent always sends her child for full scho
rise in 	s	. Below s+, there is a unique steady state equilibrium schooling (s*
sector denoted by E which is stable in nature. If s
reaches s*u. Beyond s*u schooling keeps on falling till it reaches s*
employed in skilled sector send their children for full
sector i.e. s∗ = 1. 
 
 unskilled sector and skilled sector when skilled parent 
 
dynamics of schooling for both unskilled and skilled sectors 
oling. s	is 
t-1 is below s*u schooling keeps on rising till it 
u. 
 schooling. Steady state schooling in skilled 
 
throughout rising with 
u ) in unskilled 
All parents who are 
Proposition 3: When s>s+, a skilled parent always sen
schooling of child of an unskilled parent would converge to the stable equilibrium E.
 
If s<1, full schooling would be the 
following figure: 
Figure 3: Dynamics of schooling for both unskilled sector and skilled sector when both skilled 
and unskilled parents send their children for full schooling
 
4.2 Dynamics of human capital
In this section, we discuss dynamics of human capital. Since human capital accumulation 
function is given by ht = bst-1, s
st-1= s∗) human capital will also be in steady state (h
will be similar to that of schooling. Here, growth rate of human capital is constant. The 
comparative static results which hold true for steady state schooling will hold true for steady 
state human capital as well. Therefo
This is true for both the case of skilled parent and unskilled parent.
ds her child for full schooling.
only equilibrium schooling of a child. This is shown in the 
 
 
  
t= st-1implies that ht= ht+1 i.e. when schooling is at steady state (s
t= ht+1= h∗). The time path of human capital 
re,  
/∗

	 , /
∗

 and  /
∗

 will have same signs as 
 
 If s>1, the 
  
t= 
1∗

, 1
∗

	and1
∗

. 
5. Comparative static analysis when parents work in the unskilled sector 
Note that, in the case where parents work in unskilled sector the followings hold true6: 
i) 	1
∗

< 0 if A>ρ + pcc. This implies that if the adult unskilled wage exceeds the sum of the 
schooling cost and subsistence expenditure of the household, steady state schooling of child of 
unskilled parent increases with fall in child wage.  
 
ii) 1
∗

< 0. This implies that with fall in schooling cost steady state schooling in the unskilled 
sector increases.  
 
iii) 1∗

>0 .This implies that with increase in unskilled adult wage, steady state schooling will 
increase. 
 
Proposition 4: The interior steady state schooling of a child of an unskilled parent increases with 
increase in unskilled adult wage but decreases with increase in education cost. It increases with 
fall in child wage only if the adult unskilled wage exceeds the sum of the schooling cost and 
subsistence expenditure of the household. 
 
6. Policy implications 
There are many policy options to redress the issue of child labour. In this paper we discuss the 
two most popular measures world wide – child labour ban and education subsidy. When a child 
labour ban is perfectly enforced, it forces firms to withdraw children from work.  However, 
                                                          
6
 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8) of Appendix A. 
 
governments in countries where child labour is present, often do not have enough capacity and 
resources to perfectly enforce regulations on child employment (Edmonds and Shresthra 
(2012)).According to a simple model by Basu (2005), when bans are imperfectly enforced, they 
raise the cost of hiring children, as employers anticipate facing stiff fines or other penalties when 
caught using child labour. Thus, when imperfectly enforced, bans may simply lower the wages 
that children are paid. In our paper the effects of imperfectly enforced ban are studied from the 
comparative static exercise.  
 
From the comparative static exercise in our model we get the result that 1
∗

< 0 if A>ρ + pcc. 
Now, imperfectly enforced ban on child labour implies fall in child wage (φ). This implies that 
banning child labour will increase steady state schooling if the unskilled adult wage exceeds the 
sum of the schooling cost and subsistence consumption expenditure of the household. When 
unskilled adult wage exceeds the total expenditure of the household, child wage is no longer 
necessary to meet subsistence requirements of the household. In such a situation, banning child 
labour has positive impact on steady state schooling. Since child wage is no longer necessary to 
meet the subsistence requirements of the household, even if child wage falls due to child labour 
ban, still steady state schooling increases. However, if A<ρ + pcc, then 
1∗

> 0. In this case, 
unskilled adult wage is not enough to cover the total expenditure of the household. In this case, 
banning child labour will hurt the household since household depends on child wage to cover the 
subsistence expenditure of the household. So banning child labour, in this case, is not a good 
proposition. 
 
From comparative static exercise in our model we also get the result that 1
∗

< 0. This implies that 
fall in schooling cost always leads to rise in steady state schooling. So an education subsidy, 
which reduces schooling cost, will invariably have a positive impact on steady state schooling. 
 
Next we carry out a comparative study between the effects of ban and subsidy on improving 
schooling of the child. 
 
7.  Comparison between the effects of ban and subsidy 
Now we compare the effects of ban and education subsidy on steady state schooling in the case 
where parents work in the unskilled sector. 
|∗

|-|∗

| 
=  
(
)
	(	)45
(
)  
If 1<A<pc, then the above expression is positive. 
Again if pc<A<1 then also the above expression is positive. 
 
This implies that if adult unskilled wage is less than subsistence consumption expenditure or 
even if adult unskilled wage exceeds subsistence expenditure but is less than one, the effect of 
giving education subsidy is higher than child labour ban in enhancing schooling. 
 
Proposition 5: If adult unskilled wage is less than subsistence consumption expenditure or even 
if adult unskilled wage exceeds subsistence expenditure but is sufficiently small, the effect of 
giving education subsidy is higher than child labour ban in enhancing schooling. 
 
8. Model with learning by doing effect in unskilled wage 
It is well known that workers can improve their productivity by repetition of the same work 
done. Dessy and Pallage (2005), in their paper on worst forms of child labour, consider the 
learning by doing effect in the human capital accumulation function. There are many other 
papers which have emphasized on the learning by doing effect. However, these articles do not 
deal with the issue of child labour7. In the present paper, we consider learning by doing effect in 
unskilled work. We assume that the unskilled workers earn an additional income as an adult if 
they worked as child labour at their young age. An individual who works as a child earns an 
additional income after joining unskilled sector as an adult due to positive learning by doing 
effect. All other assumptions remain same as previous model. 
In this case, the income of the household headed by unskilled parent is given by: 
Yt = [A+ (1-st-1)h] + Aφ (1-st ) 
The budget constraint of the household headed by an unskilled adult is now given by: 
[A+ (1-st-1)h]+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst 
In the case of an unskilled parent, schooling of child is given by st =

	/
	

	
                                                                     
Differentiating st with respect to s	we get 

 = 

		/	
/			
	

	
	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See e.g. Lucas (1988),Mao (2012), Parente (1994), Hippel and Tyre (1993) etc. 

>0 if [-hs	! - 2s	h + {A (1+φ + h-pc}	> 0 
or s	< ± 89:;< + 2 − =<  -1=M 
 
We ignore the negative term since s	 cannot be negative. 
 

  = 
![/	

{		

		//		
	}]	

	
	$  

 <0 if h1 + s	! + A	1 + φ + 1 − 	s	h − pc − h	s	1 + 	s	>0 
or A(1+φ) + 2h - pc>0 

 >0 if A (1+φ) + 2h - pc<0 
We assume A(1+φ) + 2h - pc>0 otherwise 89:;< + 2 − =<  becomes an imaginary number. 
If M≥1, s	 is always less than M. This implies that when M≥1 >0 always. 
Now M≥1 implies 	
/ ≥ 2. 
The above condition will hold true if A1 + φ − pc>0, A (1+φ) is high and h is low. 
If M<0, then this condition is never satisfied. Equilibrium does not exist. 
Therefore if M is a fraction, then  >0 till M is reached and thereafter 

<0. 
Now M is a fraction when 0<M<1. This implies -1<	
/ <2. 
If A1 + φ > pc but A (1+φ) is low and h is high then this inequality is likely to be satisfied. 

 <0 throughout. 
 
If total earnings of the household run by unskilled parents exceed subsistence consumption 
expenditure, but are low and learning by doing effect is high, then below a particular level of 
parental schooling there is positive relationship between parental schooling and schooling of the 
child. But beyond that level of parental schooling, schooling of the child decreases with increase 
in parental level of schooling. 
 
The reason of obtaining such result is when in spite of going to school for a quite long time, 
parents are still working in unskilled sector, they lack motivation for sending their children to 
school. Moreover, as unskilled parents went to school themselves, during their adulthood, they 
are losing a part of the income that they would have earned had they worked as child labour. 
Below a particular level of parental schooling, parental schooling and child schooling are 
positively related because it is assumed that more educated parents derive more satisfaction from 
sending their children to school. But given low levels of earnings of the household and high 
learning by doing effect in unskilled sector, beyond a particular level of parental schooling there 
is a negative relationship between parental level of schooling and child schooling. This leads us 
to the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 6: The relationship between child schooling and parental schooling is monotonically 
increasing in general. However, if learning by doing is present in unskilled sector, though child 
schooling initially increases with parental schooling but decreases afterwards. 
 
In the case of a skilled parent, the household income and budget constraint of the household 
remains same as in the case of absence of learning by doing effect. 
In the case of a skilled parent, schooling of the child is given by st =
()
	

	
                                                                           
Differentiating st with respect to s	we get 

 = 
() 
	!()


	
	  

> 0 if st > 0. 
s∗= 
() 
The dynamics of skilled sector remains unchanged as the previous model where learning by 
doing was not present. 
 
If s<s+ the dynamics of s in both unskilled and skilled sectors in the presence of learning by 
doing effect in unskilled work are shown in the following diagram: 
Figure 4: Dynamics of schooling for both skilled and unskilled sectors in the presence of 
learning by doing effect 
 
In Figure 4, we demonstrate 
unskilled parent, time path of 
path becomes oscillating but remains 
schooling may be explained in the following manner: Suppose in period 1, parental level of 
schooling is low. However, parent sends her child to school for higher number of hours in 
expectation that her child may get job in the skilled sector in future. In the next period when this 
child becomes adult and finds that in spite of high schooling, she is s
sector and thus receiving lower wage as compared to what she could have earned had she worked 
as a child labour (we assume that learning by doing effect is present in case of unskilled work), 
she will send her child to school 
consecutive periods till schooling in unskilled sector converges to the steady state 
the case of unskilled parent where M is a fraction
s is convergent till M is reached, but once M is crossed, the time 
convergent. This oscillating nature of the time path of 
till working in the unskilled 
for lesser number of hours.  This process is repeated in 
 
. In case of 
s,∗ . Thus in 
this model parental preferences regarding schooling of a child and learning by doing effect 
generate cycles in the time path of schooling in unskilled sector even when there are no external 
shocks. 8 There is only one steady state level of schooling in the case of unskilled parent 
represented by s,∗  in figure 4. This equilibrium is a stable equilibrium. 
The individuals would join skilled labour force if wt+1> A+(1- st)h i.e. st>s = 
	/()
	/ . When the 
parental level of schooling lies between s,∗  and s, schooling of child keeps on falling till it 
converges to the unskilled level steady state schooling su* in an oscillating manner.  
 
In skilled sector, schooling of child always increases with increase in schooling of the parent. 
There are two equilibria in the skilled sector. s∗ denotes the level of child schooling 
corresponding to the unstable equilibrium. Below s∗, st in skilled sector keeps on falling and 
eventually converges to steady state equilibrium of unskilled sector in an oscillating manner. 
Beyond s∗, schooling of the child keeps on increasing and will eventually converge to st=1. 
Hence, the dynasties having parental skill level between s and ss* may end up in the situation 
where next generations will be working as unskilled labour. Lower is	s∗, lower is the parental 
level of human capital required to launch the economy on the path of steady growth of schooling. 
Lower s∗ is thus good for the economy. Increase in education cost (ρ), child wage (Aφ) and 
subsistence consumption expenditure (pc ) thus leads to higher s∗ which is not good for the 
economy. Increase in responsiveness of wage to human capital (δ) and improvement in education 
technology (rise in b) lead to lower s∗ which is good for the economy. The full schooling 
                                                          
8
 Zhang (2015), Zhang (2014), Croix and Licandro (1999), Croix (2001) have found oscillations in human capital accumulation but 
in different context. 
equilibrium is a stable equilibrium and the 
schooling equilibrium is denoted by 
 
Proposition 6: In the case of an unskilled parent (parental skill below 
schooling of the child is steadily convergent in nature when approached
level of parental schooling su* and beyond that s
oscillating in nature. In the case of a skilled parent, 
model. 
There exists one positive valu
If s>s+ then all parents who are employed in skilled sector send their children for full schooling
The dynamics of schooling for this case is shown in the following diagram:
Figure 5: Dynamics of schooling for skilled sector when 
In Figure 5, till M is reached, time path of  
becomes oscillating but convergent. The explanation for oscillatory time path of schooling in 
steady state schooling corresponding to the full 
s∗=1. 
 from below steady state 
u*, the time path of schooling is convergent but 
the dynamics remain similar to previous 
e of s	 say s+ for which st = 1.  
 
s>s+ 
s is convergent but once M is crossed, the time path 
s), the time path of 
. 
 
Figure 5 is similar to the explanation given for that in Figure 4. There is unique equilibrium in 
the unskilled sector. The steady state level of schooling corresponding to this equilibrium is s,∗ . 
Parents who work in skilled sector always send their children for full schooling. Steady state 
schooling in skilled sector is s∗ = 1. 
 
The comparative static results and the policy implications remain same in the presence of 
learning by doing effect as in the case of absence of learning by doing effect. 
 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper we seek to explain the long run dynamics of schooling and intergenerational 
persistence of child labour in an overlapping generations household economy model based on 
limited parental altruism. Here, the level of parental schooling determines her willingness to 
invest in the human capital formation of the child. A parent who does not undergo schooling 
herself will never send her child to school. The relationship between parental schooling and child 
schooling is monotonically increasing in both unskilled and skilled sectors in absence of learning 
by doing effect in unskilled work. However, in the presence of learning by doing effect in 
unskilled work this relationship is not monotonically increasing.  
 
As far as the long run dynamics of schooling in the basic model is concerned, when we assume 
that schooling required to be engaged as skilled worker is less than the critical level of parental 
schooling beyond which parents send their children for full schooling, i.e. s<s+ and when 
unskilled adult wage is low compared to the expenditure, i.e. s >1, schooling of a child of an 
unskilled parent converges to the interior stable equilibrium that implies partial schooling. There 
is no opportunity of full schooling of the child of an unskilled parent. For skilled parent, 
schooling of a child of a skilled parent converges to the interior stable equilibrium of the 
unskilled sector, if schooling of the skilled parent is below a critical level and if it is beyond the 
critical level, schooling of the child keeps on increasing till full schooling is reached. The partial 
schooling equilibrium in the skilled sector is an unstable equilibrium. The full schooling 
equilibrium is a stable equilibrium. When s>s+ and s >1 the skilled parent always sends her child 
for full schooling and in unskilled sector there is unique stable steady state equilibrium of 
schooling. However here also there is no opportunity of full schooling of child of an unskilled 
parent. Only when s<1i.e. unskilled adult wage is high compared to expenditure, full schooling 
would be the only equilibrium schooling of all children. In the presence of learning by doing 
effect cycles emerge in the time path of schooling in unskilled sector. However, the dynamics in 
skilled sector remain same as in the basic model without learning by doing effect.  
 
 The comparative static exercise in the basic model yields the result that if the adult unskilled 
wage is less than the subsistence consumption expenditure or even if adult unskilled wage 
exceeds subsistence expenditure but is sufficiently small, the effect of giving education subsidy 
is higher than child labour ban in enhancing schooling. Thus banning child labour may not be the 
solution for improving schooling outcome in such a situation. 
 
Our paper focuses on the supply side of the labour market while the demand side has been 
ignored. We have not considered existence of any credit market in our model. Hence, existence 
of credit market imperfections could not be studied in this context. We consider a closed 
economy model. So examining the effects of international policies against child labour is beyond 
the scope of this paper. All these may be considered for future research.  
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   Appendix A: Learning by doing is absent 
In the case of unskilled parent the Lagrangian function is 
Z= ln(ct-c) +st-1ln (bst) +λ  [{A+Aφ (1-st )-pcct -ρst] +θ(ct-c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The first 
order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
(?
( = 
	

 - λpc + θ=0             (A.1) 
 
(?
 (
 = 


 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                  (A.2)  
θ≥ 0, θ (ct-c)= 0                  (A.3)  
From (A.1) and budget constraint A+Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst, we get 
	

  (	)
   =λ                                                                                   (A.4)                  
From (A.2) and (A.4) we get, 
st =
(	
)
(
)(	
)
           (A.5)                
1∗
  =   
[]

          (A.6) 
1∗
 =
[	
]

          (A.7) 
1∗
 =  

(
)           (A.8) 
 
In the case of skilled parent the Lagrangian function is Z= ln(ct-c) +st-1ln (bst) +λ  [δbst-1+Aφ (1-
st )-pcct -ρst] +θ(ct-c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The first 
order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
(?
(
 = 
	

 - λpc + θ=0             (A.9) 
(?
 (
 = 


 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0             (A.10)  
θ≥ 0, θ (ct-c)= 0         (A.11)  
From (A.9) and budget constraint δbst-1+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst, we get 
	
( ) 
  (	)
   =λ                                                             (A.12)                     
From (A.10) and (A.12) we get, 
st =
()
 
(
)(	
)
                                                                              (A.13)  
 
st for skilled parent - st-1 for skilled parent > 0 if st-1>


()
 =s∗. This implies that once st 
crosses s∗, st will be greater than st-1i.e. st curve will lie above the 450 line in case of skilled 
sector. 
Now st for skilled parent at s = st in case of unskilled parent at s.This implies that the st curve 
will be continuous at st= s. 
 
Relation betweenAB∗ , A  and AA∗ 
s,∗= 
  
s = () 
s∗= 
() 
s∗>s if 
()> () 
 
s,∗<s if (()) ()(
)()(

/) <0 
 
Now if 

()
>

()
 , then s,∗<s 
 
Therefore if 
()>

() then s∗>s>s,∗  
In our paper we assume that 
()>

(). 
Therefore s∗>s>s,∗ . 
 
 
 
 
   Appendix B: Learning by doing is present 
In case of unskilled parent the Lagrangian function is 
Z= ln(ct-c) +st-1ln (bst) +λ  [{A+ (1-st-1)h}+ Aφ (1-st )-pcct -ρst] +θ(ct-c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The first 
order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
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
 - λpc + θ=0             (B.1)  
(?
 (
 = 


 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                         (B.2)  
θ≥ 0, θ (ct-c)= 0                 (B.3)  
From (B.1) and budget constraint [A+ (1-st-1)h]+Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst, we get 
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In case of skilled parent the Lagrangian function is Z= ln(ct-c) +st-1ln (bst) +λ  [δbst-1+Aφ (1-st )-
pcct -ρst] +θ(ct-c) 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The first 
order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
(?
(
 = 
	

 - λpc + θ=0                  (B.9) 
(?
 (
 = 


 – λ (Aφ+ρ) = 0                                                   (B.10)  
θ≥ 0, θ (ct-c)= 0                     (B.11)  
From (B.9) and budget constraint δbst-1+ Aφ (1-st ) = pcct +ρst, we get 
	
( ) 
  (	)
   =λ                                                                                           (B.12)                     
From (B.10) and (B.12) we get, 
st =
()
 
(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)
                                                                                  (B.13)  
s∗= 
() 
st for skilled parent - st-1 for skilled parent > 0 if st-1>


() =s∗. This implies that once st 
crosses s∗, st will be greater than st-1i.e. st curve will lie above the 450 line in case of skilled 
sector. 
Now st for skilled parent at s = st in case of unskilled parent at s.This implies that the st curve 
will be continuous at st= s. 
Relation betweenAB∗ , A  and AA∗ 
s,∗= 
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 , then s,∗<s 
 
Therefore if 
()>

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()
 /
 then s∗>s>s,∗  
In skilled sector, st (at st-1 = 	s - s	= [()
]
	
  
Since we assume in our paper 
()>

	/
()
	/ , therefore [st in skilled sector (at st-1 = s-s	 ] <0. 
This implies that st at s lies below the 450 line in skilled sector. 
 
